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O

f all the threats to security and US interests in Asia, the confrontation across
the Taiwan Strait is surely the most perilous over the long run and has the
greatest potential for erupting into a war between the United States and China. As
Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington wrote in the summer of 2001, “Perhaps nowhere else on
the globe is the situation so seemingly intractable and the prospect of a major war
involving the United States so real.”1
Today, that outlook is even more dire as China, Taiwan, and the United
States have hardened their positions, even if the rhetoric has been less harsh for
the most part recently. China has new leaders who cannot afford to be less than
adamant on the Taiwan question. Taiwanese leaders have been pushing their island further away from the mainland, drawing Chinese warnings that military
force would be employed if Taiwan goes too far. The United States, under President Bush, has demanded that any settlement of the Taiwan question be peaceful
and in accord with the wishes of the people of Taiwan. Beyond that, the Administration has repeatedly reminded the Chinese of US obligations under the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 to help Taiwan defend itself.
All of this has reduced diplomatic maneuvering room and made for a
situation in which a miscalculation could cause an eruption. Admiral Thomas B.
Fargo, Commander of US Pacific Command, told a gathering last summer at the
East-West Center, a research organization in Hawaii, that among the issues concerning him was “a miscalculation between strategic rivals, and I’m talking
about China and Taiwan and India and Pakistan here.”2 Earlier, the Admiral told
Congress that among the “fundamental challenges” he would confront was “the
potential for accelerated military competition or, worse, gross miscalculation between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, or some other strategic rivals.”3 His
predecessors, Admirals Dennis Blair and Joseph Prueher, are known to have
been concerned about the same possibilities.4
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This emphasis on Taiwan is not to play down the risk of hostilities elsewhere in Asia. In North Korea, the regime of the late Kim Il Sung and his son,
Kim Jong Il, has a long history of duplicity that has earned Pyongyang a place in
President Bush’s “axis of evil.” The North Koreans have broken at least four
agreements on not producing nuclear arms and have moved ahead on a clandestine program to add those weapons to their arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons. Their massed forces, replete with artillery, along the 4,000-meter-wide
demilitarized zone dividing the peninsula have put the South Korean capital of
Seoul in harm’s way. Compounding the threat from North Korea is rising antiAmericanism in Seoul that jeopardizes the US alliance with South Korea. Deterrence on the Korean peninsula has worked, for the most part, for 50 years, but if it
should fail, nearly every military observer in Asia agrees that the North Koreans
would be roundly defeated, their capital overrun, and their regime consigned to
the ash bin of history. The casualties might be dreadful, but the combined power
of the Republic of Korea and the United States would prevail.
In the South China Sea, through which passes half of the world’s shipping—more than through the Panama and Suez canals combined—piracy in several straits, territorial disputes, and a Chinese claim to sovereignty over most of
that sea are hazards to seaborne trade. Around the littoral of the sea, terror has
spread to the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. US officials have
said, however, there is no Afghanistan to give the terrorists haven. Moreover,
several Southeast Asian governments have moved against the terrorists, and US
forces in the southern Philippines have helped Filipino troops fight Muslim extremists. Clearly, the US Navy could keep those sea lanes open, but at a heavy
cost in forces, time, and money.
In South Asia, the United States will not enter a war, nuclear or otherwise, between India and Pakistan over the disputed province of Kashmir. If hostilities would erupt, however, the United States most likely will be tasked with
helping to clean up a horrendous mess. Hundreds of thousands of wounded would
overwhelm medical facilities, the destruction of transport and power grids would
leave vast areas crippled, and hordes of refugees might wander the land seeking
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food, water, and shelter. The humanitarian disaster would tax the US armed forces
and nongovernmental relief agencies to the limit.

W

ith all this, the quarrel over Taiwan rises to the top of the list because it
could turn into a clash of empire. That would determine whether the United
States retained its security posture in the Western Pacific or would be forced to
withdraw so that China could exert the hegemony it wielded as the Middle Kingdom in the days of yore. Beijing’s long-term goal would be to exert such political,
economic, and military power that no decision of importance could be made in any
capital in Asia without China’s approval.
Moreover, the dispute over Taiwan is dynamic and volatile, the focal
point of maneuvering between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. It is in constant
danger of igniting, as evidenced by the strains after the US accidental bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the collision of a Chinese
fighter with a US Navy EP-3 over the South China Sea in April 2001. Each incident brought tensions to a boil. The year 2002, culminating in the summit meeting between President Bush and President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) was relatively quiet, the Chinese perhaps having concluded that
the United States is not the paper tiger that the revolutionary leader Mao Zedong
once thought.
The underlying conflict has not gone away, however. Subtle evidence
surfaced in the press briefing after Presidents Bush and Jiang met at the Bush
ranch in Crawford, Texas, in October 2002. Despite the smiles and polite rhetoric, President Bush noted, “It is inevitable that nations the size of the United
States and China will have differences.” President Jiang agreed: “It is only natural for China and the United States to disagree from time to time.”
During their summit, President Bush broached the subject of Taiwan after discussing China’s spotty record on human rights, suppressing minorities, and
silencing dissent. He told Jiang that his China policy was based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the Three Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982 between the
United States and China, all of which call for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.
“We intend to make sure that the issue is resolved peacefully,” he said.
President Jiang meanwhile put Taiwan high on his list of priorities, saying, “We have had a frank exchange of views on the Taiwan question, which is of
concern to the Chinese side.” He asserted, “China has never engaged in expansion nor sought hegemony,” which even the most cursory reading of Chinese history will show is not so.
The disagreement came out in stark relief in President Bush’s National
Security Strategy, which attracted little attention when it was published in September 2002, and in President Jiang’s report to the 16th Communist Party Congress just before he stepped down as party Chairman in November 2002. The
Bush document, while saying the United States “seeks a constructive relationship” with China, notes “profound disagreements.” One such is “our commit24
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ment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.”5 Jiang, who
kept his post as head of the Central Military Commission, clothed an iron fist in a
velvet glove, praising the people of Taiwan for their “glorious patriotic tradition”
but warning, “The Taiwan question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely.”6
The potential Sino-US confrontation arises from Beijing’s obsession
with the island off its southeastern coast that was long a backwater of the Chinese
empire with a distinctive language and culture. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the
Treaty of Shimonoseki after Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of
1894-95 and was part of the Japanese Empire until 1945, when World War II ended
with the surrender of Japan. Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 but never said to whom sovereignty passed.
Meantime, the Nationalist Chinese forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek were run off the mainland by Mao Zedong’s Communists and took refuge on
Taiwan in 1949. Chiang’s regime claimed to be the sole and legitimate government
of all China and vowed to retake the mainland. After his death in 1975, that dream
faded. Successive governments in Taipei gradually turned to democracy and economic development, making Taiwan an “Asian tiger” along with South Korea,
Hong Kong, and Singapore.
The communist government in Beijing wants possession of Taiwan for
several reasons:
l Surging nationalism. National pride is perhaps the prime motive for
capturing Taiwan. Chinese leaders see Taiwan as the last vestige of the humiliation by Japan and the West during the colonial period when imperial powers
carved China into spheres of influence. China reclaimed Hong Kong, the British
colony, in 1997, and Macau, the Portuguese colony, in 1999. Taking Taiwan
would complete that trilogy and end the civil war with the Nationalists.
l Political embarrassment. Taiwan has become a democracy, even if a
fragile one, over the last decade. Despite the internal controls exerted by the
Beijing regime, it cannot shield the Chinese people from the example of democratic progress in Taiwan, which the Communist Party fears could jeopardize its
grip on power. David Zweig of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology has written that the Chinese people are not so politically apathetic as
some argue.7
l Subversive freedom. Political observers in Taipei have noted that visitors from China have been impressed with the freedom the Taiwanese experience.
“They are surprised by the freedom we have to work where we want, to change
jobs, to live where we want, to read different views in the newspapers, and things
like that,” said a Taiwanese scholar. Beijing is unhappy when those visitors return
to China with what the authorities consider to be subversive views.8
l Spreading separatism. An editor of a trade journal sat in a coffee
shop in Shanghai several years ago and explained her personal dilemma over Taiwan. “I think Taiwan should be part of China,” she said, “but I don’t think it’s
worth fighting over. On the other hand, if we give up Taiwan, the Tibetans will
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push harder to separate from China and so will the Uighurs in Xinjiang.” She lamented, “What will become of my country?”9
l Strategic geography. Chinese leaders see Taiwan as a critical link in
a chain of containment that begins with US forces in Korea and Japan and runs
south through Taiwan to the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, nations with
which the United States has security treaties. The United States is committed
through the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with sufficient arms to defend itself. Beijing seeks to break that chain and to project power into the Pacific.
Moreover, Taiwan sits astride the two northern channels into the South China
Sea, most of which China claims as internal waters.10
l Economic capacity. Absorbing Taiwan’s vibrant economy and technological prowess, especially in electronics, would be a plus for the troubled Chinese economy. China has already benefited from Taiwanese investment and trade.
The government in Taiwan, however, has sought to discourage investment on the
mainland so that Taiwan does not become too closely integrated with China economically; it seeks to steer investment toward Southeast Asia.
l Diverting attention. Some China hands believe that Chinese leaders
play up the Taiwan issue to divert attention from China’s political struggles and
economic difficulties. China is passing through a tense transition from the Third
Generation to the Fourth Generation of leaders at the same time corruption is
rampant, the banking system is riddled with bad loans, industrial productivity
lags (especially in state-owned enterprises), and 125 million people—equal to
the population of Japan—are unemployed.
In sum, China’s leaders see bringing Taiwan into the PRC as a crucial
step in establishing Chinese influence over East Asia and in driving the United
States from the Western Pacific. That explains the relentless drumbeat emanating
from Beijing. Taiwan is the central question in every meeting between Chinese and
American officials, in every academic gathering that includes Chinese scholars,
and in many private conversations with Chinese visitors to the United States.
The Chinese pound the issue to the point of tedium. Hu Jintao, who has
succeeded Jiang as Chairman of the Communist Party, told Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage in August: “The separatist activities of ‘Taiwan independence forces’ pose the gravest threat to peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait, and [are] an element of sabotage to peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific
region.” Quoted in the People’s Daily, Hu said: “We will never allow the independence of Taiwan nor tolerate the harm caused by separatist forces in Taiwan
to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”11
Bonnie S. Glaser, a respected China watcher, has written that mainland
officials harbor “no illusions” about Taiwan and have called for increased pressure on Washington to rein in Taiwan’s pro-independence leanings. China has accelerated the development of credible military options intended to deter formal
separatism and to prepare for the use of force should China’s leaders deem that
necessary.12
26
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Therein lies the danger of miscalculation. Chinese political leaders and
senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army have said repeatedly that China
will attack Taiwan if the government in Taipei declares independence. That has
been coupled with Chinese contentions that the United States will not fight for
Taiwan because few Americans see Taiwan as important. More than one Chinese
has asked, “Why should Americans care about what happens to Taiwan?”13
American military leaders have cautioned the Chinese that they would
be mistaken in thinking the United States will back down if confronted by a Chinese military threat to Taiwan. Leaders of the Pacific Command have told the
Chinese directly that their command stands ready “to respond to any potential
crisis, including the use of force against Taiwan by China.”14
Some American specialists on China believe the US response to the terrorist assaults in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 has given the
Chinese pause, especially after the swift projection of ground and air power into
Afghanistan. Others contend, however, that the Chinese think the American fervor
for the war against terror will recede and will not return if China attacks Taiwan.

I

n Taiwan itself, people have become increasingly intent on remaining detached from the mainland, even if they are not ready to declare independence
for fear of provoking the PRC. There is a growing sense of Taiwanese identity
and a desire for self-determination. Democracy has taken hold, even if its roots
are still in shallow ground, and that has reinforced the Taiwanese quest to retain
charge of their own future.
Over the past 50 years, native-born Taiwanese first gained control of
the economy from mainland Chinese who came to Taiwan in 1949. They have
gradually taken over the government bureaucracy, the universities, the press, the
armed forces, and, most recently, the nation’s politics. The first President born in
Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui of the Nationalist Party, was elected in 1996 in the nation’s
first direct presidential election. The second, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic
Progressive Party, came to office in May 2000. His inauguration featured Taiwanese music and dancers and an address replete with references to Taiwan’s
identity. “Taiwan stands up,” Chen declared several times.15
In Taipei, a Western diplomat summed up the mood: “You must understand,” he said, “that the Taiwanese today have the chance to determine their own
destiny for the first time ever.” To underscore his point, he repeated, “for the first
time ever.”16 He referred to the long domination by Chinese dynasties, the occupation by Japan, and the harsh rule of the Nationalists, perhaps better known by
the Chinese name of Kuomintang, or KMT, from 1949 until the death of Chiang
Kai-shek in 1975. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded him, eased the rigid rule
of the KMT, and chose Lee Teng-hui to be Vice President, opening the way for a
Taiwanese to accede to the top job.
Zweig pointed to a billowing sense of identity in Taiwan. Nearly 88 percent of those polled in a Taiwan Social Change Survey in 2000 responded that
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“The dispute over Taiwan is dynamic and volatile,
the focal point of maneuvering between
Taipei, Beijing, and Washington.
It is in constant danger of igniting.”

they considered themselves Taiwanese or Taiwanese-and-Chinese, up from 75
percent only five years before. Just eight percent saw themselves as only Chinese, down from 19 percent in 1995.17
That new sense of identity has been coupled with a drive toward democracy. Zweig found that “ethnic identity, and the fact that the Taiwanese felt
like an oppressed ethnic group on their own soil, encouraged the emergence of
democracy.” His research showed that only 23 percent of those polled agreed
that “the government should decide which type of opinion should be allowed to
spread in society” while 39 percent said, “too many political parties lead to political chaos.”
Perhaps most revealing, Taiwanese have been voting with their feet,
with 77 to 83 percent of the eligible voters having turned out in the last three national elections. (In the United States, barely half the voters have gone to the ballot box in recent elections.) “Finally,” Zweig writes, “Taiwan’s effort to position
itself in a positive light in contrast with the continuing authoritarian regime on
the mainland further propelled it to adopt democratic structures.”18
A critical figure is Chen Shui-bian, the intense, shrewd, and energetic
52-year old President of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Since taking office,
Chen has sought to expand what the Taiwanese call their “international space,”
which means keeping their distance from the PRC while seeking greater recognition abroad. Chen, combining domestic politics, diplomacy, economic policy,
and military acquisition, has put Beijing on the defensive again and again by proposing talks intended to lower tensions. Beijing, however, has said it would talk
only if Chen accepted their version of the “One China” principle, which means
acknowledging Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Chen has countered by offering talks with no conditions set. A standoff has been the result.
Chen was an early member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
made up largely of native Taiwanese who opposed the ruling KMT. Selfdetermination and independence were among the mainstays of their position, with
Chen advocating moderation to give the party flexibility. In 1991, some members
of the DPP sought to make the establishment of Taiwan as a nation a goal of the
party. To make the proposal less threatening to China, Chen suggested the policy
28
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be stated: “Based on the principle that sovereignty belongs to the people, the issue
should be decided by all the residents of Taiwan through a plebiscite.”
Chen was elected mayor of Taipei in 1994. Toward the end of his term,
when he was mentioned as a presidential candidate, Chen said in an interview
that Taiwan need not declare formal independence because, as President Lee
Teng-hui had argued, the Republic of China had been a sovereign and independent government since the revolution of 1912 led by Sun Yat-sen. Asked whether
he would seek a referendum as President, Chen said that would not be necessary
so long as “certain big powers,” which he did not name, did not abandon Taiwan.
If they did, he said, he would seek a referendum on a declaration of independence, and asserted “we will win.”
During his presidential inaugural address, Chen said again he would not
seek a referendum. In August 2002, however, Chen caused considerable consternation in Beijing and Washington by suggesting that the national legislature
adopt a law making a referendum possible. This came right after he suggested
that Taiwan be prepared to “take its own path.” Beijing called the proposal “a brazen provocation” and threatened military action. A senior official in Washington
said Chen’s remarks were “unfortunate,” especially after his government had
given Washington no notice that he intended to make them.19
Americans with contacts in Taiwan and strategic thinkers in Taipei speculated that Chen had changed his mind after two years of being rebuffed by Chinese leaders and sought to force Beijing to respond. Moreover, the Chinese
Communist Party was in the midst of the struggle over who would succeed Jiang.
And Chen may have been trying to divert the attention of voters because he had not
yet cleaned up scandals in Taiwanese politics.20
Beyond that, Chen has proposed that democratic nations in Asia form
an “Asian democratic alliance” to help persuade authoritarian nations such as
China to become democratic. “For Taiwan, as a prime example of the global third
wave of democratization, we are willing to cooperate with like-minded countries
to contribute to the consolidation of Asian democracy and to promote democracy
throughout the continent, notably in China,” he told the Asia-Pacific Democratic
Cooperation Forum in Taipei.21
Similarly, Chen has sought to strengthen Taiwan’s ties to several nations by proposing free trade agreements with the United States, Japan, Singapore, Panama, and New Zealand by the end of 2005.22 Taiwan joined the World
Trade Organization at the same time as the PRC in 2002. Taiwan runs an annual
trade surplus with the United States, but seeks to keep it in hand so as not to
arouse US protectionists.
In other foreign policy moves, Taipei has supported the US campaign
against terror and claims to have spent $100 million on counterterrorism, with
much of that going to aid projects in Afghanistan.23 The government has sought
American advice on how to set up a peacekeeping force. Taiwan’s diplomats continue to knock on the door of the World Health Organization and other internaSpring 2003

29

tional agencies. Taiwan has sought, with little chance of success, to regain the
seat it abandoned in the United Nations General Assembly in 1971.
In short, President Chen has led a concerted effort to gain international
recognition and to move closer to formal independence. Therein lies the danger
of miscalculation. If Chen misjudges where the brink might be and either treads
too close or steps over the line, that would almost certainly provoke a vigorous
Chinese response, including the use of military force.

T

his is the situation in which the United States finds itself, largely by President Bush’s choice. By any measure, he has shown the strongest support for
Taiwan of any American President since Richard Nixon traveled to Beijing 30
years ago. President Jimmy Carter shifted US diplomatic relations from Taipei to
Beijing in 1979. President Ronald Reagan was more concerned with the Soviet
Union than with Asia. President George H. W. Bush allowed F-16 fighters to be
sold to Taiwan, but more to score political points during a US election campaign
than to defend Taiwan. President Bill Clinton hit a hard left rudder, coming close
to acknowledging Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.
The current Bush Administration wasted little time in setting out its
policy on Taiwan. The most forceful statement came from Secretary of State
Colin Powell in testimony before Congress in January 2001: “Let all who doubt,
from whatever perspective, be assured of one solid truth: We expect and demand
a peaceful settlement, one acceptable to people on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait.”24 The demand that decisions about their homeland have the assent of the
people of Taiwan had crept into US rhetoric during the Clinton era, but has been
made part of policy by Bush.
Secretary Powell reinforced that pledge in June 2002 in a speech before
the Asia Society in New York:
America’s position is clear and it will not change. We will uphold our “One China”
policy and we continue to insist that the mainland solve its differences with Taiwan
peacefully. Indeed, a peaceful resolution is the foundation on which the breakthrough Sino-American communiqués were built, and the United States takes our
responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act very, very seriously. People tend to
refer to Taiwan as “The Taiwan Problem.” I call Taiwan not a problem, but a success story. Taiwan has become a resilient economy, a vibrant democracy, and a generous contributor to the international community.25

Bush’s pledge that the United States would do “whatever it takes” to
help Taiwan defend itself is well known. So is his Administration’s permit for
Taiwan to buy modern weapons for $4 billion. Defense Minister Tang Yaoming’s journey to Florida in March to meet with Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, and representatives of
America’s defense contractors was the most high-level meeting between US and
Taiwanese defense leaders in decades. Later, Taiwan’s Vice Minister of Defense,
30
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Kang Ning-hsiang, met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz in Washington, thus becoming the most senior Taiwanese defense official to come to
Washington since 1979.26
Less well known has been a thorough revision of US war plans to help
Taiwan repel an unprovoked attack by the PRC. Under Admiral Blair, who retired as Commander of the Pacific Command in May 2002, those plans were updated to account for the Chinese acquisition of modern Russian warplanes and
warships and addressed weaknesses in Taiwan’s defenses. “That was laborious
stuff,” said one officer. “It took thousands of man-hours. Some of the staff had to
work so hard they started calling it the ‘Blair Witch Project,’” referring to a popular horror movie.
At the same time, Blair told Chinese leaders that US forces were prepared to fight on behalf of Taiwan if a political decision was made to do so and
that the defense of Taiwan would be worth risking American lives.27 Whether
Chinese leaders believed him is open to question, as they have asserted that the
United States would not take that risk.
Admiral Blair’s relief, Admiral Fargo, who took command in May
2002, indicated Taiwan’s defensive flaws in response to questions from Congress. He ticked off a list that included command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Fargo said the
United States should help in “improving their integrated sea and air defense
capability and assisting them in the integration of their components into an effective joint defense.”28
In Washington, a Pentagon official explained that “helping Taiwan
needs to go beyond hardware. There has been a growing realization here that
arms sales are only half of the equation. They need to learn more about operating
the equipment, about strategy, about joint operations.”
Inviting military officers and defense officials from Taiwan to the Asia
Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii fell into this category. In
November 2001, the Defense Department, which funds the APCSS, instructed the
center to invite Taiwanese alternately with officers from the PRC. The first three
Taiwanese came for the APCSS course that ran from May to August 2002. American officers may observe Taiwanese military maneuvers in the spring of 2003.
Admiral Blair said the APCSS’s mission “builds confidence, bridges
cultural differences, and helps eliminate potentially dangerous military misunderstandings.” He continued:
It only makes sense for APCSS to include Chinese perspectives on key issues for
the benefit and understanding of APCSS participants. APCSS also desires and includes Taiwan’s participation. Taiwan provides a vivid example of social, political,
and economic transformation. As a showpiece of free-market ideals and democratic
government, Taiwan’s perspective is also valuable to all of our participants—
including China.29
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T

he expansion of American military ties with Taiwan has been accompanied
by a fading of the “strategic ambiguity” that previously marked American
policy. That ambiguity was intended to keep Beijing and Taipei guessing about
how the United States would respond to hostilities across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing was not to know if the Americans would charge across the sea, nor was
Taiwan to have any assurance that the cavalry would ride to the rescue. The intent
was to deter both sides from rash action.
As strategic ambiguity has ebbed, positions have hardened all around.
Bush officials have emphasized the Taiwan Relations Act, or TRA, which says
that an assault on Taiwan would be “of grave concern to the United States.” The
TRA was passed by Congress over President Carter’s objections after he
switched diplomatic ties to Beijing from Taipei, and President Bush has been
more forceful than his predecessors in emphasizing the TRA. It is the law of the
land and takes precedence over the Three Communiqués, a point the Chinese
choose not to acknowledge.
Bush officials also have revived what are known as the “Six Assurances.” Adopted by President Reagan in 1982, they commit the United States to
continued armed sales to Taiwan, to preclude getting Beijing’s okay for those
sales, and to avoid mediating between Beijing and Taipei. Reagan pledged to uphold the TRA, to assert that sovereignty over Taiwan had not been decided, and
not to press Taiwan to negotiate with China.
For their part, the Chinese contend that the Three Communiqués of
1972, 1979, and 1982 are evidence that the United States agrees that Taiwan is
part of China. Not quite. Powell, in carefully crafted language during his confirmation hearing, said:
The United States has long acknowledged the view that there is only one China. In
that respect, Taiwan is part of China. How the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan resolve the differences and interpretation of that view is up to them, so long as
military force is not one of the methods used. In the meantime, we will stand by Taiwan, and we will provide for the defense needs of Taiwan in accordance with the
Taiwan Relations Act.

Note that Powell “acknowledged the view,” which is not the same as saying “agrees
with the view.”30 Moreover, the Chinese ignore the provisions in the Three Communiqués on peaceful settlement and have insisted that China retains the right to
use force to resolve the dispute. Some Chinese argue that the communiqués have
the standing of a treaty. In neither international nor US law is that so.
Even those who earlier espoused strategic ambiguity have started to
question it. Kurt Campbell, who was a senior official in President Clinton’s Pentagon, wrote in Foreign Affairs: “This policy of ambiguity has become difficult to
explain and perhaps even more difficult to implement in recent years.” Campbell
noted a growing debate over whether the United States “should move toward a pol-
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icy of more explicit deterrence to prevent both provocative [Republic of China]
political actions and coercive PRC military steps.”31
Admiral Blair drew a distinction between political and military ambiguity:
“You have to understand that it’s only political ambiguity, it’s not military ambiguity. There’s no question as to what the military facts are in China and Taiwan.”32
“Strategic ambiguity,” however, has not been replaced by “strategic clarity.” Although the Bush Administration started down that path, it has been sidetracked by the campaign against terror since 11 September 2001, the confrontation
with Iraq, and another confrontation with North Korea.
A lack of consensus among American decisionmakers has been even
more of an obstacle. They can be divided into at least four schools:
l Panda huggers, a derisive term for those on the ideological left who
assert that America must accommodate China’s emerging power, even at the expense of Taiwan’s freedom.
l Business executives and entrepreneurs, who pursue the age-old
dream of selling toothbrushes to 1.2 billion Chinese. Most care little about what
happens to Taiwan—unless they do business there.
l Balancers, including many American military officers, who say the
United States should engage and deter China at the same time. Taiwan’s fate is to
be determined by the Taiwanese.
l Demonizers, a derisive label for right-wingers who demand that
China be confronted at every turn, although not contained as was the Soviet Union
during the Cold War.
President Bush’s stance on Taiwan, which appears to be balanced, has
several motivations. Perhaps most far-reaching, the world has changed since
President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, crafted the
Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 with Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zhou
Enlai. The primary purpose then was to enlist China in the Cold War against the
Soviet Union; the fate of Taiwan was subordinated to that. Today, the Soviet
Union is no more and the Russian confederation is not considered dangerous,
even though China and Russia have patched up their differences and Russia is
helping China to strengthen its armed forces.
Besides its strategic location, Taiwan’s future is linked to America’s
credibility. Cutting through diplomatic verbiage, the United States must help defend Taiwan—or see its alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia crumble. A failure to aid Taiwan would be seen all over Asia
as a lack of American resolve and would damage, and possibly destroy, the
United States as a power in the Western Pacific.
Then there is domestic politics. The Bush Administration is driven by
the slogan ABC—anything but Clinton. The distaste for the policies of President
Clinton, including what they see as his soft posture on China, is palpable.
Hard-line conservatives, critical of any US move that would appear to accommodate China, press Bush from his right.
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More long range is American public opinion. The US view of Taiwan has
become more favorable as Taiwan has held elections and fashioned a free-market
economy. A recent Gallup poll showed that 62 percent of Americans had a favorable image of Taiwan, while 22 percent had an unfavorable view and 16 percent
had no opinion. Two years ago, only 47 percent had a favorable view of Taiwan.
As David Zweig concluded: “Taiwan’s democratic transition places
enormous pressure on the US government to maintain its support for the Taiwanese regime.”33 Americans, who preach democracy and respect for human rights,
cannot abandon a democracy and still retain moral credibility. This is a question
of the destiny of 23 million people who want little more than to be left alone to
determine their own future as a democracy and market economy. In the maneuvering of heavyweights, the fate of small nations—and their people—should not
be overlooked.
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